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Too Big to Fail and Too Big to Pay:
States, Their Public-Pension Bills, and the
Constitution
by DEBRA BRUBAKER BURNS*
Introduction
Faced with the most severe budget crises since the Great
Depression, many state officials and lawmakers within the United
States are desperately trying to pay their bills and balance their
budgets. States are anticipating significant budget deficits for the
next few years, while tax receipts are slowly recovering from the steep
economic downturn in 2008, unemployment rates remain high, and
federal stimulus money is running out. Among the states' mounting
stacks of unpaid bills are their aggregate unfunded pension liabilities
totaling from an estimated $452 billion to over $2.54 trillion,
depending on what accounting discount rate is used.
State pension plans cover twenty-four million active and retired
workers, about eight percent of the United States population of 309
* Juris Doctor Candidate 2012, University of California, Hastings College of the
Law; Doctor of Philosophy, University of Minnesota. The author thanks Professor Calvin
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1. PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, THE TRILLION DOLLAR GAP: UNDERFUNDING
STATE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS AND THE ROADS TO REFORM 3 (2010), http://downloads.
pewcenteronthestates.org/TheTrillionDollarGapjfinal.pdf [hereinafter PEW CTR. ON
THE STATES, THE TRILLION DOLLAR GAP] (giving lower-end estimate of $452 billion, an
aggregation of fiscal year 2008 funded status taken from the states' own reports and based
on governmental accounting principles). Pew Center is a research and lobbying group for
state plan managers. Robert Novy-Marx & Joshua D. Rauh, Policy Options for State
Pension Systems and Their Impact on Plan Liabilities 1 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Res.,
Working Paper No. 16453, 2010), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/wl6453.pdf.
Finance Professors Novy-Marx and Rauh calculate the state-pension shortfall to be $1.3
trillion if calculated using the Treasury discounting method and $2.54 trillion if calculated
using taxable municipal discounting. Id. at 3.
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million in 2010.2 When financial markets plunged in 2008, so did the
assets in states' pension systems.' Beyond the current pension
funding gap, some financial analysts and state officials see pension
4bills increasing at a rate that is unsustainable in the long run.
Assuming no significant changes to the already promised pension
benefits to state workers, seven states would have insufficient funds
to pay those obligations past the year 2020, even with an optimistic
eight-percent return on the assets of state pension systems.5
According to Finance Professor Joshua D. Rauh, an additional
twenty states would run out of funds to cover already accrued pension
benefits past 2025.6 This suggests that substantial contributions will
be needed over the next fifteen years to pay for legacy liabilities!
Meanwhile, a number of governors are trying to curtail pension and
other benefits for new state employees, while financial analysts are
recommending increased taxes and more severe budget cutting as
2. The Bureau of Labor Statistics of the U.S. Department of Labor reports that as of
March 2010, state and local governments employ over fifteen percent of the 129 million
nonfarmer workers in the United States. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, A Snapshot of
State and Local Government Employee Benefits, 3 PROGRAM PERSPECTIVES 1 (2011),
available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/perspectives/program-perspectives-vol3-issuel.pdf.
State employees by themselves account for roughly four percent of American nonfarmer
workers. Id.
3. Michael A. Fletcher, Governors from Both Parties Plan Painful Cuts Amid Budget
Crises Across the U.S., WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 2011, at A17, available at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/0 7/AR 2 011020703650.html.
4. Id. Collectively, states have a projected budget deficit of $175 billion through
2011, which is in addition to the $230 billion in budget gaps that states filled between fiscal
2009 and 2011. Id. For example, the 2011 budget shortfalls for California, New York, and
New Jersey were projected at $25 billion, $10 billion, and $11 billion, respectively. Id.
Ronald Snell, a senior analyst of the National Conference of State Legislatures, observes
that public officials, who are feeling pressure to cut spending and not raise taxes, are
focusing on pensions. Ron Snell, NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, Pension
Reform: Not Easy, But Worth It, (July-Aug. 2010), http://www.ncsl.org/?tabid=20716.
5. The Role of Public Employee Pensions in Contributing to State Insolvency and the
Possibility of a State Bankruptcy Chapter: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Courts,
Commercial, and Administrative Law, 112th Cong. 1 (2011) [hereinafter Role of Public
Employee Pensions-statement of Joshua Rauh] (statement of Joshua Rauh, Associate
Professor of Finance, Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill.), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/112th/112-25_64585.PDF at 49.
6. Id.
7. In October 2010, Professors Robert Novy-Marx and Joshua D. Rauh raised their
estimates of unfunded state-pension liability to almost $27,000 per American household.
In June 2009, they estimated the pension shortfall as high as $3.23 trillion, which is roughly
equivalent to $21,500 for each of the approximately 150 million households that filed tax
returns with the Internal Revenue Service in 2008. Robert Novy-Marx & Joshua D. Rauh,
The Liabilities and Risks of State-Sponsored Pension Plans, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 191, 196
(Fall 2009).
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necessary to bring states' long-term obligations such as pensions in
8line with revenue.
The subject of a state defaulting or repudiating any type of debt
has received relatively little attention in the legal literature because
until recently, the legal issues concerning state defaults on debt, or in
particular defaults on state pension funds, were considered too
remote to attract the attention of legal scholars. Yet in recent
months, more than a few economists, reporters, academicians,
lawyers, and politicians are arguing about legal solutions for pension
liabilities that are too big to pay, including possible federal bailouts
for states that are deemed "too big to fail."9
This note presents the legal limitations that many states face if
they were to default on or repudiate any of their pension obligations,
and analyzes two proposed solutions to the states' expanding pension
liabilities. Section I provides general background on state pension
programs and their current financial condition. Section II analyzes
how courts within the last few decades have interpreted states'
pension obligations, paying particular attention to legal requirements
under the Contract Clauses of the federal and state constitutions.
Section III describes a modest proposal for a federal government
bailout of state pensions through federally subsidized debt obligation
bonds conditioned upon states moving from defined-benefit to
defined-contribution pensions. Section IV analyzes the more radical
and controversial proposal that Congress institute bankruptcy for
states, using similar procedures and restrictions found in the
bankruptcy code for municipalities. The conclusion suggests that
courts would likely find constitutional the two proposed solutions-
conditional pension obligations bonds and bankruptcy for states-
although each has legal as well as practical and political issues.
8. Fletcher, supra note 3. For example, Michigan Governor Rick Snyder proposed a
new state tax on public and private pensions. RICK SNYDER, STATE OF MICHIGAN
EXECUTIVE BUDGET: FISCAL YEARS 2012-2013 at 7 (2011), available at http://www.
michigan.gov/documents/budget/1 345974_7.pdf.
9. GARY H. STERN & RON J. FELDMAN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE HAZARDS OF
BANK BAILOUTS 13 (Brookings Institution Press 2004) (Representative Stewart
McKinney is credited with coining in 1984 the phrase "too big to fail" in connection with
the government bailout of Continental Illinois, the seventh largest bank in the United
States).
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I. Background on State Pension Programs and
Their Current Financial Condition
The diversity of opinions on the size and severity of state
pension-fund liability results from disparate underlying assumptions
among analysts and interest groups."o For example, the two-trillion-
dollar difference between the low and high estimates of the state
pension liabilities results in large part from the wide range of
estimated future rates of return on pension assets from less than one
to eight percentage points annually.n
10. Most people agree that states as an aggregate currently have a serious pension-
funding problem. Nevertheless, views diverge widely on how severe or extended the
problem will be, and what actions, if any, need to be taken to solve the underfunding of
state pensions. The current media debates on state pensions reflect the interests of five
groups. The first and foremost is the public employees and retirees who expect to be paid
the promised pension benefits. The second group is the pension systems themselves with
obligations but increasingly limited resources to pay them. The third includes state
lawmakers and officials searching for solutions to pension underfunding as well as major
state budget deficits. The fourth is the state taxpayers who increasingly resent the
possibility of an additional tax load while struggling to fund their own retirements. The
last group comprises analysts who among themselves disagree on the severity of pension-
funding shortfalls, and whether the problems of those shortfalls are short-term or are more
long-term systemic problems.
11. Estimating pension liabilities on the low side are pension advocates who follow
the Government Accounting Standards Board and assume returns on assets to calculate
pension debts. Jeffrey R. Brown & David W. Wilcox, Discounting State and Local
Pension Liabilities, 99 AM. ECON. REV.: PAPERS & PROC. 538, 538 (2009) (referencing
Novy-Marx & Joshua D. Rauh, The Intergenerational Transfer of Public Pension Promises
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 14343, 2008)). They assume that the
actual return will be identical to the targeted return and do not take into account the risk
that if the assets do not return the targeted seven percent or eight percent, the state and
ultimately the taxpayers are required to make up the difference. Novy-Marx & Rauh, The
Liabilities and Risks of State-Sponsored Pension Plans, supra note 7, at 195. As an
example of the risk, Novy-Marx and Rauh calculated that Ohio, at its 2009 level of tax
collection, would need to dedicate 8.75 years of tax revenue to pension funding to catch up
on pension obligations accrued to 2009. Id. at 197. This estimate does not include the
additional revenue needed to fund new benefits that employees continue to accrue. Id.
See also Brown & Wilcox, supra, at 538. They contend that the value of the pension
liability instead should depend on the risk of the stream of cash flow associated with that
liability, rather than on the pension assets that back the liability. Id.; Novy-Marx & Rauh,
The Liabilities and Risks of State-Sponsored Pension Plans, supra note 7, at 195. This
would suggest a lower discount rate of four percent or five percent, or if taking a very
conservative financial position, the "risk-free" discount Treasury rate, which is currently
less than one percentage point. Brown & Wilcox, supra, at 539. These economists would
likely evoke the well-worn financial disclaimer: past performance does not guarantee
future results.
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A. Pensions Types: Defined-Benefit and Defined-Contribution Plans
Most states offer defined-benefit rather than defined-
contribution types of pension plans to their employees. Pensions can
be divided into two major types-the traditional defined-benefit
planl2 and the defined-contribution plan." Defined-benefit plans
guarantee a specific retirement benefit, usually an annuitized income,
no matter how the underlying securities and assets that back the
defined-benefit plans perform.14  This means that the state as
employer takes the financial risk and is obligated to make up the
difference between what it has promised to its retirees and what funds
are required to meet those promises." Around ninety percent of state
public employees have traditional defined-benefit plans and close to
eighty percent of them participate in these plans." If the state
pension plans are underfunded or do not produce the income needed
to cover the required payments to its retirees, the state and ultimately
taxpayers have the financial risk to make up the shortfall."
Under often less generous defined-contribution plans, the
employer contributes a defined amount to a retirement fund that the
12. See I.R.C. § 414(j) (West 2011); 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.401-1(b)(1)(i), and 1.401(A)-
1(b)(1)(i), (iii).
13. See I.R.C. § 414(i) (West 2011). Generally, I.R.C § 415(b) limits the amount a
pensioner can receive from an employer-defined benefit plan to the lesser of a specific
"dollar limit" ($195,000 is the limitation in 2011) or one hundred percent of the
participant's average compensation for his or her three highest years. Government
workers, however, are exempted from those limits. I.R.C. § 415(m) (West 2011). State and
local governments are allowed to pay benefits in excess of the 415(b) limit by establishing a
"qualified excess benefit arrangement" and holding the funds separately from the pension
trust. Id. For a general overview of the two basic pension types, see Stephen P. McCourt,
Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution Plans: A History, Market Overview and
Comparative Analysis, 43 BENEFITS & COMPENSATION DIG. 1 (2006), http://www.ifebp.org/
PDF/webexclusive/06feb.pdf.
14. The United States labor force of the 1920s saw the introduction of the traditional
defined benefit plan, a plan in which the employer promised to pay to the employee an
annual pension, determined in accordance with a predetermined formula. Susan J.
Stabile, Is It Time to Admit the Failure of an Employer-Based Pension System? 11 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 305, 307 (2007).
15. For a discussion on the debate about whether state and local governments should
shift away from defined-benefit to defined-contributions plans, see Jonathan Barry
Forman, Public Pensions: Choosing Between Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution
Plans, 1999 MICH. ST. L. REV. 187 (2000).
16. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 2, at 2. See generally ROBERT L.
CLARK, LEE A. CRAIG & JACK W. WILSON, A HISTORY OF PUBLIC SECTOR PENSIONS IN
THE UNITED STATES (2004). Early in the twentieth century, states began instituting
pensions for state employees. Id.
17. McCourt, supra note 13.
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employee uses for retirement income." Defined-contribution plans
depend on the value of underlying securities and assets and give no
defined guarantee of payment.'9 Some state workers may have an
option to participate in a defined-contribution program as well as the
defined-benefit program. A small and growing percentage of
government workers, like Michigan state employees hired since
1997," have no option to participate in a defined-benefit plan and are
enrolled in defined-contribution plans similar to those in the private
sector.2 1
Financial analysts and economists have evaluated the current
pension-funding rates for the states' defined-benefit plans as well as
the projected long-term financial condition of state pensions. While
some analysts advocate for radical changes to pension programs for
continued financial viability of pension systems, others consider much
of the public concern regarding pension funding to be overreactions
to relatively short-term problems caused by two severe financial
recessions since 2000.22
18. PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, PROMISES WITH A PRICE: PUBLIC SECTOR
RETIREMENT BENEFITS 10 (2007), http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpew
trustsorg/Reports/State-policy/pensionjreport.pdf [hereinafter PEW CTR. ON THE
STATES, PROMISES WITH A PRICE]. The Internal Revenue Service's definition of a
defined-contribution plan is found in I.R.C. § 414(i).
19. Stabile, Is It Time to Admit the Failure of an Employer-Based Pension System?,
supra note 14, at 307. The private pension reforms of the mid-1970s and early 1980s led to
a sharp turn away from traditional defined-benefit plans. Sylvia Nasar, Pensions Covering
Lower Percentage of the Work Force, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1992, at A2, http://
query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9EOCEFD81330F930A25757COA964958260&pa
gewanted=2. Many private-sector employers closed their pension programs and moved
their employees to a defined-contribution scheme or employee-funded 401(k) retirement
plan. Stabile, supra note 14, at 307. The estimated percentage of workers participating in
private pension plans in 1991 dropped down to forty-three percent from the peak of forty-
nine percent in 1979. Nasar, supra note 19, at Al. Many other commentators have
discussed the shift from defined-benefit to defined-contribution plans in the private sector.
See, e.g., JOHN H. LANGBEIN, SUSAN J. STABILE & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 58-62 (4th ed., Foundation Press 2006); Regina T. Jefferson,
Rethinking the Risk of Defined Contribution Plans, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 607, 613 (2000);
Susan J. Stabile, The Behavior of Defined Contribution Plan Participants, 77 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 71,74-75 (2002).
20. Richard C. Dreyfuss, Policy Brief, Michigan's Public-Employee Retirement
Benefits: Benchmarking and Managing Benefits and Costs, MACKINAC CENTER FOR
PUBLIC POLICY (Oct. 25, 2010), http://www.mackinac.org/archives/2010/S2010-05.pdf.
21. PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, PROMISES WITH A PRICE, supra note 18, at 33.
22. Iris J. Law & Elizabeth McNichol, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES,
Misunderstandings Regarding State Debt, Pensions, and Retiree Health Costs Create
Unnecessary Alarm 3 (2011), http://www.cbpp.org/files/1-20-llsfp.pdf. Law and McNichol
argue that proponents overstate current fiscal problems of the states, fail to acknowledge
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B. Uncertainty of Pension Liabilities and Funding Ratios
Divergent assumptions of pension payouts and rates of return on
investments help explain why estimates of the unfunded state pension
liabilities range widely from $452 billion to $2.54 trillion.23  This
makes it difficult for pension administrators and states to determine
what the optimal funding level should be to meet future pension
obligations. The low estimates of liability are based on the pension
funds earning higher expected rates of return from riskier stock and
bond portfolios, while the high estimates of pension liability are based
on the pension funds earning a riskless rate of return on investments
such as Treasury bonds.24
In recent years, many state pension plans have assumed a rate of
return on assets of eight percent or more, a rate lower than their
investments returned in the 1990s, but much higher than their
aggregate negative return since 2000.25 State pension plans have
invested in portfolios heavily weighted towards equities, which can
result in greater volatility in the value of assets, funding ratios, and
unfunded liabilities.26
Demographic and lifestyle changes also have increased pension
liabilities within the last decade, and the uncertainty of future
liabilities in state pension funds.27 For example, in recent years more
public employees took early retirements, sometimes in response to
state inducements for early retirement.28 Additionally retirees are
*29living longer, increasing pension costs per retiree.
that severe problems concentrate in a few states, and often promote extreme actions
rather than more reasonable solutions. Id.
23. Novy-Marx & Rauh, Policy Options for State Pension Systems and Their Impact
on Plan Liabilities, supra note 1, at 3; Law & McNichol, supra note 22, at 2; PEW CTR. ON
THE STATES, THE TRILLION DOLLAR GAP, supra note 1, at 3. In part because of these
widely divergent estimates, some lawmakers have proposed laws that would force states to
change the way they calculate and report their pension liabilities for their pensions to
maintain their tax-exempt status. Law & McNichol, supra note 22, at 2. See also DEAN
BAKER, CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY RES., THE ORIGINS AND SEVERITY OF THE PUBLIC
PENSION CRISIS 1 (2011), http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/pensions-2011-
02.pdf.
24. Law & McNichol, supra note 22, at 3. Historically, pension funds have invested in
diversified stock and bond portfolios that have earned average rates of return higher than
the riskless rate of a Treasury rate. Id.
25. PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, THE TRILLION DOLLAR GAP, supra note 1, at 24.
26. Id. at 23-24.
27. Id. at 18, 31.
28. Id. at 18.
29. Id. at 24.
259
As late as 2007, states had funded about eighty-five percent of
their pension liability, a level considered healthy by many analysts,
including those at the U.S. Government Accountability Office.30
Since then the rates at which states have funded their pensions have
dropped substantially, in some states by as much as thirty to forty
percentage points."
II. Judicial Interpretation of States' Pension Obligations
Most state employees have enjoyed strong legal protections that
prevent any significant reductions to their state pensions." This
protection comes from the judicial interpretation of state pension
obligations as contracts under the Contracts Clause of the United
States Constitution, and under similarly worded contract clauses of
some state constitutions or specific statutory provisions regarding
public pensions.33 Only a few states have weaker protections for state
pensions under the theories of a pension obligation as an implied
contract or mere gratuity. Because states have waived their sovereign
immunity, state employees have sued states for pension plan changes,
and often have been successful in stopping reductions to their pension
benefits. Yet it is unclear what would happen if a financially
30. Id. at 16. In 2008, before the major downturn in the securities market had
affected pensions' overall assets, states' systems in fiscal year 2008 were eighty-four
percent funded. Id. The funding ratio equals the actuarial value of assets divided by
actuarial accrued liabilities, and provides a fairly good measure of a state's ability to cover
its pension obligations. BARRY W. POULSON & ARTHUR P. HALL, AMERICAN
LEGISLATIVE EXCHANGE COUNCIL, STATE PENSION FUNDS FALL OFF A CLIFF 5 (2010),
http://www.alec.org/am/pdf/tax/ALECFINAL pension-fundssplit.pdf.
31. PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, PROMISES WITH A PRICE, supra note 18, at 5. In the
1990s, the aggregate funding rate of the states reached eighty percent, and by 2000, the
ratio exceeded one hundred percent, in large part due to the booming economy and strong
investment growth through the 1990s. Law & McNichol, supra note 22, at 3. In the late
1990s and early 2000s, when half the states' pension plans were fully funded, many states
increased pension benefits. PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, PROMISES WITH A PRICE, supra
note 18, at 5. Since then, the recessions of 2001 and 2008 sliced significant value from
pension-fund assets. Law & McNichol, supra note 22, at 3.
32. Simpson v. N.C. Local Gov't Employees' Ret. Sys., 363 S.E.2d 90, 91-93 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1987) (noting the "kaleidoscope of multifarious and conflicting views" of pension
rights, and reviewing five approaches, including the "traditional common law" view that
"public employee pensions are gratuities creating no contractual rights until the member
satisfies all of his retirement requirements"). For a recent analysis of the Contracts Clause
challenges in current public pension litigation, see Paul M. Secunda, Constitutional
Contracts Clause Challenges in Public Pension Litigation, 29 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J.
(forthcoming 2011), available at http:// papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
id=1806018.
33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
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distressed state sovereign were to unilaterally change or repudiate
terms of its public-pension obligations over court objection.
A. Pension Obligations under Contract Theory
1. Is the Pension Obligation a Contract?
A majority of states' courts have interpreted state pensions to be
binding contracts between the state offering public-pension benefits
and its employees in return for their services. Assuming public
pensions are contracts with public employees, they would be
protected by the Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution,
which provides that "No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing
the Obligation of Contracts."3 4  Courts give heightened scrutiny to
state contracts and typically enforce terms of a contract if it appears
that a state has significantly and unreasonably impaired a contract
regarding public pensions or otherwise." In a state where its
constitution or statutes guarantee that public-pension benefits cannot
be diminished, courts might be expected to apply a high level of
scrutiny to any modification of a pension contract.36
United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey provides the Supreme
Court's modern-era Contract Clause interpretation, as applied to the
repudiation of public contracts.37 The Court uses a four-step test to
34. Id. For a discussion on the reasons why the Contracts Clause applies only to the
states and not the federal government, see Michael W. McConnell, Contract Rights and
Property Rights: a Case Study in the Relationship Between Individual Liberties and
Constitutional Structure, 76 CAL. L. REV. 267 (1988).
35. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 244 (1978).
36. Eight states have constitutional provisions protecting pensions. ARIZ. CONST.
art. XXIX § 25, HAW. CONST. art. XVI, § 2; ILL. CONST. art XIII, § 5; LA. CONST. art I, §
23; MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 24; N.M. CONST. art. II § 19; N.Y. CONST. art. V, § 7; TEX.
CONST. art I, § 16; and WIS. CONST. art I § 12. For example, article V, section 7 of the
New York Constitution states: "After July first, nineteen hundred forty, membership in
any pension or retirement system of the state or of a civil division thereof shall be a
contractual relationship, the benefits of which shall not be diminished or impaired."
States like Kentucky have general language in their statutes that pension benefits are an
inviolable contract. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.692 (West 2010). Some states statutes
have more specific language, such as New Jersey's statute that gives a nonforfeitable right
to receive pension benefits upon attainment of five years of service credit. N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 43:3C-9.5 (West 2010). A contractual relationship can arise from a statute "when
the language and circumstances [of the statute] evince a legislative intent to create private
rights of a contractual nature enforceable against the [government]." Andrews v. Anne
Arundel County, 931 F. Supp. 1255, 1260 (D. Md. 1996), affd without opinion, 114 F.3d
1175 (4th Cir. 1997) (quoting United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 17 n.14
(1977)).
37. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
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determine whether 1) a contract exists, 2) it is substantially impaired,
3) it has a public purpose, and 4) it is reasonable and necessary."
In United States Trust, the states of New York and New Jersey
borrowed money from the public for the Port Authority and
promised in return to not subsidize rail transit. 9 Later, the states
repealed the promise and altered the contracts. 0 Under the first step,
the Court found that contracts existed between the states and their
bondholders and then it analyzed the contract alterations under the
last three steps. The Court ultimately struck down the states' actions
because the significant impairment of the contracts with the
bondholders was not "reasonable [or] necessary to serve an important
public purpose." 41
2. Is the Contract Substantially Impaired?
Once a court determines that a contract with a state exists under
the first step, it will evaluate whether a challenged law or change to
the contract operates as a "substantial impairment of the contractual
relationship" under the second step of the United States Trust test.42
After determining contract validity of state pension obligations under
this step, a court analyzes whether a state has substantially impaired
any pension obligations. An impairment occurs if one party of a
contract alters any term of a contractual relationship43 and is
substantial "where the right abridged was one that induced the parties
to contract in the first place, or where the impaired right was one on
which there had been reasonable and especial reliance."44 If the law
operates as only a minimal or no impairment, then it does not violate
the contract clause and the judicial inquiry ends.45
A judicial dividing line between what constitutes minimal
impairment and what constitutes substantial impairment to a state
contract is not clear, and where it is drawn varies among jurisdictions.
The Fourth Circuit, however, provides an exemplary interpretation.
38. Id. at 17, 23, 25.
39. Id. at 10-11.
40. Id. at 13-14.
41. Id. at 25, 31.
42. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 244 (1978); see United States
Trust, 431 U.S. at 21.
43. Allied Structural Steel, 438 U.S. at 240.
44. Baltimore Teachers Union v. Mayor of Baltimore, 6 F.3d 1012, 1017 (4th Cir.
1993).
45. Allied Structural Steel, 438 U.S. at 244.
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In Baltimore Teachers Union v. Mayor of Baltimore, the Fourth
Circuit notes that the Supreme Court has provided little guidance as
to what constitutes substantial impairment, but assumes that a
substantial impairment occurs "where the right abridged was one that
induced the parties to contract in the first place or where the impaired
right was on which there had been reasonable and especial reliance."4
An aggrieved party's reliance on the contractual obligation
appears to be "the primary yardstick" by which the Fourth Circuit
Court determines the degree of impairment.47 In Andrews v. Anne
Arundel County, Maryland, the Fourth Circuit Court found that a
pension-benefit reduction was likely more substantially impairing
than a salary reduction, after noting the centrality of reliance in an
employee's contractual right for compensation at the contractually
specified level.' The reason for the greater degree of impairment is
"because the individual receiving pension benefits is typically already
living on a reduced income as compared to her pre-retirement
earnings."49
While a court in the Fourth Circuit likely finds a retroactive
diminution of public-pension benefits to be substantial impairment, it
might not find substantial impairment of pension terms as long as
changes do not adversely affect the benefits, or if adversely affected,
are replaced with comparable benefits.o Similarly, the Seventh
Circuit Court found in analogous private-pension contracts that "[a]n
employer is free to move from one legal plan to another, provided
that it does not diminish vested interests . . . ."" Therefore, unless a
46. Baltimore Teachers Union, 6 F.3d at 1017 (internal citations omitted).
47. Andrews v. Anne Arundel County, 931 F. Supp. 1255, 1265 (D. Md. 1996), aff'd
without opinion, 114 F.3d 1175 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing Baltimore Teachers Union, 6 F.3d at
1018 n.8).
48. Andrews, 931 F. Supp. at 1175 (finding that the county's retroactive reduction of
pension benefits to affect cost-saving was unconstitutional). Courts also have found
substantial impairments in temporary changes to contracts such as temporary wage freezes
or deferment of salary payments. See Buffalo Teachers Fed'n v. Tobe, 464 F.3d 362, 368
(2d Cir. 2006) (confirming the district court's determination that a "wage freeze
substantially impairs the unions' labor contracts with Buffalo"); Ass'n of Surrogates and
Supreme Court Reporters Within New York v. New York, 940 F.2d 766, 772 (2d Cir. 1991)
(noting that a statute affecting timing of payment of salary substantially impaired public
employees' contract).
49. Andrews, 931 F. Supp. at 1175.
50. City of Frederick v. Quinn, 371 A.2d 724, 726 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977)
(concluding that "the employee must have available substantially the program he
bargained for and any diminution thereof must be balanced by other benefits or justified
by countervailing equities for the public's welfare").
51. Cooper v. IBM Personal Pension Plan, 457 F.3d 636, 642 (7th Cir. 2006).
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reduction in pension benefits has been replaced by a benefit sufficient
to mitigate the impairment, a court following the Fourth Circuit's
analysis might conclude that the pension-benefit reduction is a
substantial impairment.
Courts might not find substantial impairment where legislation
or collective bargaining agreements for pension contract terms
operate prospectively. For example, in Maryland State Teachers
Ass'n v. Hughes52 and Howell v. Anne Arundel County, Maryland" the
district court explained that the contract clause only protects against
retroactive diminution of vested benefits and no contract clause
violation occurs when legislation applies prospectively to non-vested
plan benefits. In these cases, the court found no impairment because
a reduced cost-of-living adjustment to the pension benefits would
only apply to benefits earned after the effective date of the
legislation.54
Recognizing their legal limitations, many states with significant
multi-year budget deficits have been trying to reduce pension costs
without entangling themselves in impairment issues. For example,
some states are offering different contract terms to new employees
such as higher retirement-age requirements, longer vesting periods,
lower cost-of-living adjustments, and 401(k)-styled defined
contribution plans that provide lower costs and benefits when
compared to those of their current employees and retirees." Because
these contract terms for new employees do not change an existing
contract, they do not impair a contract. Yet, when a state tries to
introduce similar contract terms to contracts of existing employees
that reduce pension benefits, a court may find significant impairment
to the pension contract.
3. Does the Impairment Have a Public Purpose?
If the change to a pension contract operates as a substantial
impairment under the second prong of the United States Trust test, a
court determines whether the impairment has a significant and
52. Md. State Teachers Ass'n v. Hughes, 594 F. Supp. 1353, 1363 n.6 (D. Md. 1984).
53. Howell v. Anne Arundel County, 14 F. Supp. 2d 752, 755 (D. Md. 1998).
54. Md. State Teachers Ass'n 594 F. Supp. at 1362 (noting that "one legislature
can[not] bind subsequent legislatures for work and services to be performed by State
employees and teachers in the future"); Howell, 14 F. Supp. 2d. at 756.
55. John Keefe, State Pension Plans Scramble to Avoid Bankruptcy, INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTOR, Feb. 16, 2011, at 1, available at http://www.cnbc.com/id/41642979/
StatePensionPlans_ScrambletoAvoidBankruptcy.
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legitimate public purpose under the test's third step." Among a
state's important public purposes is to balance its budget and manage
taxpayer money in a fiscally sound manner." The court, however,
cautions against assuming that a state's financial decisions always are
serving a legitimate public purpose: "If a State could reduce its
financial obligations whenever it wanted to spend the money for what
it regarded as an important public purpose, the Contract Clause
would provide no protection at all.""
Although not determinative to the judicial outcome, courts might
find actions to properly manage and fully fund its pension programs
as a legitimate public purpose because "ensuring the financial
integrity of the [government] is a significant public purpose."
Further, all states except Vermont emphasize the public purpose of
their financial soundness by including in constitutional or statutory
provisions requirements to balanced their operating budgetsW and a
number of states have further constitutional protection for pension
funding."
4. Is the Impairment Reasonable and Necessary?
Assuming the legislation has a significant public purpose under
the third step of the United States Trust test, a court analyzes under
the fourth step whether the impairment to the contract was
reasonable and necessary to satisfy that important public purpose.6
The analysis with this last step often provides the most point and
counterpoint to arguments between parties.
In United States Trust, the Supreme Court held that "less
impairing" means were available to preserve energy and improve rail
transit.63 Reasonable alternatives and less impairing means might
56. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 27 (1977).
57. Baltimore Teachers Union v. Mayor of Baltimore, 6 F.3d 1012, 1019 (4th Cir.
1993).
58. United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 26.
59. Baltimore Teachers Union, 6 F.3d at 1019.
60. NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, NCSL FISCAL BRIEF: STATE
BALANCED BUDGET PROVISIONS 2 (2010), http://www.ncsl.org/documents/fiscal/
StateBalancedBudgetProvisions20l0.pdf.
61. For example, around thirty states have constitution pension protections
specifically covering educators. NAT'L EDUCATION ASS'N, NEA ISSUE BRIEF ON
PENSION PROTECTIONS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 3 (2004), http://www.nea.orglassets/
docs/PensionProtectionsinStateConstitutions04.pdf.
62. United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 29-31.
63. Id. at 25-26.
265
have included raising taxes, cutting spending, or selling off assets.'
Thus, "[a] state may not justify an impairment of its contractual
financial obligations to others simply because it would rather spend
the money for some other public purpose."6 In short, the Court did
not find that it was reasonable or necessary for the states to revoke
their promise not to subsidize rail transit." The needs for energy
preservation and promoting mass transit were foreseeable at the time
the states made the promises and nothing had radically changed since
then."
In the public-pension context, a state would need to show the
court that its impairment to pension obligations was reasonable and
necessary. As part of its fact-specific analysis, a court would
determine whether more reasonable alternatives were available and
whether the state could have foreseen the problems it cites as reasons
for needing to change terms of a pension contract.
The question of whether the severity of pension liability in recent
years was foreseeable may be debated. From the pension holder's
perspective, the pension underfunding may be the result of
mismanagement, reduced state revenue, or some other reason for
which a pension holder has no responsibility. Further, the pension
holder may argue that the problems with pension funding are
overblown, that states have alternatives to solve their financial
problems, and that impairing state pensions is not necessary. For
example, Dean Baker of the Center for Economic and Policy
Research argues that the pension shortfall has been misrepresented in
public debates, and the primary reason for the shortfall is the plunge
in the stock market from 2007 through 2009.' He asserts that the
pension shortfall remains manageable because it is less than 0.2
percent of the projected gross state product over the next thirty years
in most states.69 Even the largest shortfalls, he argues, is less than a
half percent of projected state product, and some of the shortfall is
likely to disappear with more recent stock market growth.
To buttress Dean's point, some analysts point to the recent
pension funding failure as a part of a normal business cycle and
64. Id. at 26.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 29-30.
67. Id. at 32.
68. BAKER, supra note 23, at 4, 10, 15.
69. Id. at 1.
70. Id.
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recessionary market decline.7 ' Alternatively, even if the Great
Recession was not part of a normal business cycle, and instead was a
generational market collapse, a significant market downturn is
unlikely in the foreseeable future. Advocates for pension holders
would urge the court to leave pension contracts untouched because a
state can make up the shortfall as its budgets strengthen, and market
forces will cover the pension funding gap over time. In short, the
pension holder's position may be that any reduction to pensions is
unreasonable and unnecessary.
From the perspective of a state such as Illinois, the pension
shortfalls are unlikely to be fixed with the passing of time, and it may
be necessary to impair pensions to make them sustainable. While
many factors may have caused the current state budget crises,
economists have pointed to two primary reasons for the possible state
default on pension-fund obligations. First, many states over-promised
benefits to employees during the financially flush 1990s. 74  Second,
many states have projected unrealistic amounts of funding resources
or rates of return for current and future pension investments.75 Also
contributing to some of the pension underfunding, states can argue,
71
are systemic structural issues such as early retirements, generous
cost-of-living adjustments, past sharing with retirees of excess returns,
double-dipping of retirees into more than one pension,' and spiking
71. Id. at 1-2. See also Law & McNichol, supra note 22, at 2; David Madland & Nick
Bunker, CTR FOR AM. PROGRESS AcTION FUND, STATE BUDGET DEFICITS ARE NOT
AN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION PROBLEM 4-5 (2011), http://www.american
progressaction.org/issues/2011/03/pdf/statebudgetissuebrief.pdf.
72. See Law & McNichol, supra note 22, at 3; BAKER, supra note 23, at 15.
73. Joshua D. Rauh, Are State Public Pensions Sustainable? Why the Federal
Government Should Worry About State Pension Liabilities (May 15, 2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract jd=1596679&.
74. PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, PROMISES WITH A PRICE, supra note 18, at 8-9.
75. Brown & Wilcox, supra note 11, at 538-39.
76. See Faulkenbury v. Teachers' and State Emp. Ret. Sys. of N.C., 483 S.E.2d 422,
429 (N.C. 1997) (concluding that changing a plan that no longer encourages people to take
early retirement through disability, because it pays more than a salary, and is not an
important public purpose that justifies the impairment of contractual rights).
77. See Retired Adjunct Professors of the State of R.I. v. Almond, 690 A.2d 1342,
1347-1348 (R.I. 1997) ("[T]he challenged legislation was both reasonable and necessary to
advance the legitimate public purpose of fostering public confidence in the State's
retirement system by restricting the proclivity of some public pensioners to indulge in
what is colloquially referred to as "double dipping"-that is, the simultaneous receipt by
retired public employees of both a salary for state reemployment and a state pension");
but see Wiggs v. Edgecombe County, 632 S.E.2d 249 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (concluding that
saving taxpayer money, improving retirement system, and correcting inequities-such as
"double dipping"-are not valid reasons for impairing contractual rights.).
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of final salaries with overtime pay and vacation payouts to increase
that factor into calculation of retirement pay." Some states have tried
to change contract terms with new employees that address the above-
mentioned issues.
States in significant financial distress have either taken or are
considering further impairments. Among them are capping of the
salary on which public pensions are figured; raising retirement ages;
requiring employees to pay into the pension system or requiring
additional employee contributions; and requiring a minimum number
of hours of work per week before an employee receives pension
credit."
States may assert that their severe budget shortfalls were
unforeseeable, and any proposed changes to their pension plans are
both reasonable and necessary to insure long-term sustainability of
their defined-benefit pension funds. Nonetheless, a state court will
evaluate a pension contract to determine whether a state had less
impairing or reasonable alternatives to its impairing action. The
court also will evaluate how necessary impairment is on two levels: 1)
whether a less drastic modification could have been implemented;
and 2) whether, even without modification, a state could have
achieved its stated goals.80 For example, a court may find a state's
impairing action unconstitutional if the court determines that the
state's action impairs a contract or burdens the pension holder more
than an alternative action that could have been taken." Given
decades of judicial rulings that have protected pensions of
governmental employees and retirees from impairments, the states
have a difficult evidentiary bar to clear before a court will find an
impairment to be reasonable or necessary.
The Contract Clause, however, does not prohibit all state actions
that impair a contract and in rare cases, a court has ruled an
impairment of a pension to be constitutional" After carefully
scrutinizing Maryland's actions and its possible alternatives, a
Maryland court in 1984 found that state legislation impairing pension
78. PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, THE TRILLION DOLLAR GAP, supra note 1, at 28.
79. Mary Williams Walsh, In Budget Crisis, States Take Aim at Pension Costs, N.Y.
TIMES, June 19, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/20/business/20pension.html?scp
=2&sq=mary%20williams%20walsh&st=cse.
80. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1977).
81. Nev. Employees Ass'n v. Keating, 903 F.2d 1223, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding
that all employees have contract rights "subject to reasonable modification").
82. United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 21.
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obligations was constitutional because 1) the law was reasonable and
necessary to financially stabilize retirement systems, 2) it spread their
cost more equitably across present and future taxpayers, and 3) it
helped the state to plan fiscally." In applying the United States Trust
test, the Court evaluated the extent of the impairment, the possibility
of less drastic contract modifications, and the possibility that
Maryland could have achieved its stated goals without modifications.'
The court noted that "[a] pension system need not be actuarially
unsound before a legislature may move to change the system and the
benefits it provides its members."" In the end, the court found "the
impairment to be minimal at worst."8 1
B. Pension Obligations Under Promissory Estoppel Theory
Like most other courts, Minnesota courts analyze pension
obligations under contract law where an actual contract such as a
collective bargaining agreement exists, but where a contract does not
clearly exist, it relies on the promissory estoppel theory rather than
implying a contract." Minnesota's courts are currently the only state
courts that will interpret a vested pension as a property right."
Nevertheless, Minnesota courts typically find that employees' pension
rights may not be changed to the employees' detriment after they
have retired because the conditions precedent to the pension
obligation has been fulfilled.89
83. Md. State Teachers Ass'n v. Hughes, 594 F. Supp. 1353, 1372 (D. Md. 1984).
84. Id. at 1362 (citing the Supreme Court). "The extent of impairment is certainly a
relevant factor in determining reasonableness." United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 27.
Necessity is judged on two levels: 1) whether a less drastic modification could have been
implemented; and 2) whether, even without modification, a state could have achieved its
stated goals. Id. at 29-30.
85. Md. State Teachers Ass'n, 594 F. Supp. at 1368.
86. Id. at 1370.
87. Amy B. Monahan, Public Pension Reform 2 (Univ. of Minn. L. Sch. Legal Stud.
Res. Paper Series, Res. Paper No. 10-13, 2010), available at http://lhc.ca.gov/studies/
activestudies/pension/UniversityofMinnesota.pdf.
88. Id. at 22. Under the theory of promissory estoppel, once an employee's service
has been performed in reliance on the state's offer of pay and benefits such as a pension,
the state is not free to retroactively change the terms upon which the service was
performed. Christensen v. Minneapolis Mun. Emp. Ret. Bd., 331 N.W.2d 740, 748-49
(Minn. 1983) (promissory estoppel may be invoked to enforce a public employer's promise
of pension benefits prescribed by statute).
89. Christensen, 331 N.W.2d at 749 (holding that the retiree had a protectable right to
be paid a pension when he retired); Law Enforcement Labor Services, Inc. v. County of
Mower, 483 N.W.2d 696 (Minn. 1992) (holding that upon retirement in reliance on the
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C. Pension Obligations as Mere Gratuity
Early in their history, pensions were considered gratuities that
did not vest, which meant that a benefit could be withdrawn or
amended at any time.' This gratuity theory treats the pension as a
gift, and thus most states have rejected it under their laws that ban
state gifts to individuals.9' In the last few decades, only Texas,'
Indiana" and Arkansas94 have chosen the gratuity approach. While
the gratuity approach technically permits benefits to be reduced or
eliminated, gratuity states have nonetheless tended to bargain with
their labor unions and honor pension promises when an employee has
satisfied all eligibility requirements.95
D. Judicial Interpretations on Vesting
Courts are fairly consistent in concluding that once a public
employee's right in a pension vests, any modification other than
increased benefits may be an unconstitutional impairment. Judicial
opinions diverge, however, in how they determine when the
employee's contract or property right in a pension vests. Vesting is
county's promise of pension benefits a retiree's right is vested for the life of the retiree and
cannot be altered absent the retiree's express consent).
90. Monahan, supra note 87, at 3.
91. See, e.g., Yeazell v. Copins, 402 P.2d 541, 543 (Ariz. 1965) (holding that if a state
constitution bans states gifts to individuals and pensions are gifts, then paying a pension
benefit would be unconstitutional).
92. See, e.g., Kunin v. Feofanov, 69 F.3d 59, 63 (5th Cir. 1995) (observing that "Texas
law is clear that a person's property right in a public pension is subordinate to the state's
power to determine to whom benefits are to be paid, to set conditions for receiving such
benefits, to modify benefits paid, or to abolish the pension and accrued benefits
altogether").
93. See, e.g., Haverstock v. State Pub. Employees Ret. Fund, 490 N.E.2d 357, 360
(Ind. Ct. App. 1986) ("In order for a right to vest or a liability to be incurred it must be
immediate, absolute, complete, unconditional, perfect within itself and not dependent
upon a contingency.. . . Moreover, it is well settled [that] a mere expectance of a future
benefit, or a contingent interest in property founded on anticipated continuance of
existing laws, does not constitute a vested right.") (internal citations omitted); Ballard v.
Bd. of Tr. of Police Pension Fund, 324 N.E.2d 813, 815 (Ind. 1975) (following the gratuity
approach with involuntary or compulsory plans, where an employee has no choice on
whether to contribute to the pension plan or receive compensation).
94. See, e.g., Blackwood v. Floyd, 29 S.W.3d 694, 694 (Ark. 2000) (holding that
noncontributory pension benefits are a mere gratuity); cf Jones v. Cheney, 489 S.W.2d 785
(Ark. 1973) (holding that vested pension benefits funded with employee contributions are
protected from impairment).
95. Monahan, supra note, at 87 n.1 (suggesting the good faith of Texas, which in 2009
left unchanged the benefits of current employees in the Texas Employee Retirement
System and only made changes to pension plans for new hires).
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when an employee acquires an unconditional entitlement to a share in
a pension fund.
In states where pensions are considered contracts, some courts
find that public employees acquire unalterable contractual rights at
the signing of their employee agreements.' Assuming a binding
contract is created on an employee's first day of work and remains in
effect until the employee ends employment, a court may require a
state to protect future benefit accruals as well as benefits already
earned. In other states, the rights to a pension vest when the
employee joins a pension plan and those vested rights may not be
impaired, although a state may reserve the right to revise or amend
the public-pension plan." Some state courts interpret a pension
contract to include the worker's own pension contribution, so at the
point where a worker first contributes funds to his or her own pension
plan, the contract cannot be changed." In other states, the statute
authorizing the public-pension benefits may say specifically that
employee contributions will fluctuate based on the funding needs of
the plan.?
96. See, e.g., Yeazell v. Copins, 402 P.2d 541, 541 (Ariz. 1965) (holding that public
employee had right to rely on terms of legislative enactment relating to pension as it
existed at time he began employment, and that subsequent legislation could not be
arbitrarily applied retroactively to impair contract); Calabro v. City of Omaha, 531
N.W.2d 541, 551 (Neb. 1995) (holding that a "public employee's constitutionally protected
right in his or her pension vests upon the acceptance and commencement of
employment").
97. See, e.g., Davis v. Mayor of Annapolis, 635 A.2d 36 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994)
(recognizing that the state follows majority view that pension benefits are contractual, but
"under certain circumstances the government may unilaterally modify them so long as the
changes do not adversely alter the benefits, or if the benefits are adversely altered, they
are replaced with comparable benefits"); Hansen v. City of Idaho Falls, 446 P.2d 634
(Idaho 1968) (recognizing that "[t]he rights of the employees in pension plans ... are
vested, subject only to reasonable modification for the purpose of keeping the pension
system flexible and maintaining its integrity.)
98. See, e.g., Jones v. Cheney, 489 S.W.2d 785, 788 (Ark. 1973) (holding that vested
pension benefits funded with employee contributions are protected from impairment);
Swann v. Bd. of Trustees of Joint Mun. Employees' Benefit Sys., 360 S.E.2d 395, 398 (Ga.
1987) (holding that where a statute establishes a retirement plan for government
employees who contribute toward the benefits and performs services while the statute is in
effect, the statute becomes part of the contract of employment so that an attempt to
amend the statute violates the impairment clause of the state constitution).
99. See, e.g., Transport Workers Union of Am., Local 290 v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth.,
145 F.3d 619, 624 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that the Metropolitan Transportation Authorities
Act reserving the right to modify the pension contract and might require employees to
make contributions did not impair the contractual relationship between employees and
authority, and thus did not violate contract clauses of United States and Pennsylvania
Constitutions); Whitely v. N.M. State Pers. Bd., 850 P.2d 1011, 1016 (N.M. 1993)
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Some courts have held that an employee's inchoate rights to
retirement benefits do not vest until an employee has performed all
employee obligations and qualifies for retirement.'" A court may
distinguish between limited and absolute vesting rights.o' Some
courts recognize a retiree's vested right at the time a pension benefit
is payable at retirement and look to their states' statutes that define
the statutorily created vested right at that time.'o2
In state courts that interpret a pension as a property and not a
contract interest, a court may determine that the pension does not
fully vest until an employee reaches the age necessary to begin
receiving benefits.103 In states where compulsory and noncontributory
pensions are treated as a mere gratuity, an employee may not be
entitled to vested rights until all eligibility requirements are
satisfied." Yet, even in states where courts have not found explicit
constitutional or statutory protection for public-pension benefits, they
still may provide limited protection for vested pension rights.0o
(determining that public employees did not have contractual right to prevent legislative
change in the rate of annual leave accrual as an unconstitutional impairment of contract).
100. See, e.g., Pitts v. City of Richmond, 366 S.E.2d 56, 58 (Va. 1988) ("Full
performance by the employee constitutes acceptance of the offer, and his previously
inchoate rights to receive payments under the plan vest and become legally enforceable.").
101. See, e.g., Nicholas v. State, 992 P.2d 262, 264-65 (Nev. 2000) ("Until an employee
has earned his retirement pay, or until the time arrives when he may retire, his retirement
pay is but an inchoate right; but when the conditions are satisfied, at that time retirement
pay becomes a vested right of which the person entitled thereto cannot be deprived; it has
ripened into a full contractual obligation.").
102. See, e.g., Herrick v. Lindley, 391 N.E.2d 729, 732-33 (Ohio 1979) ("[R]etirees
have a vested right to receive a retirement allowance or similar benefit at the rate fixed by
law when such benefit was conferred. However, neither [statute] grants a vested right to a
continuing tax exemption.").
103. See Pierce v. State, 910 P.2d 288, 305 (N.M. 1995) ("We decline to join those states
that find a contractual relationship where one does not clearly and unambiguously exist
and that proceed to justify how the legislature may nonetheless unilaterally modify this
contract without the consent of the participants."). State constitutions like that of New
Mexico recognize that public employees have in their pensions vested property rights,
protected by due process but not contractual rights. N.M. CONST. art XX, § 22D. See also
Whitely, 850 P.2d at 1014 (concluding that public employees did not have contractual right
to prevent a legislative change in the annual rate of leave accrual as an unconstitutional
impairment of contract).
104. See, e.g., Haverstock v. State Pub. Employees Ret. Fund, 490 N.E.2d 357, 360
(Ind. Ct. App. 1986).
105. See, e.g., Singer v. City of Topeka, 607 P.2d 467, 473 (Kan. 1980) ("A public
employee, who over a period of years contributes a portion of his or her salary to a
retirement fund created by legislative enactment, who has membership in the plan, and
who performs substantial services for the employer, acquires a right or interest in the plan
which cannot be whisked away by the stroke of the legislative or executive pen, whether
the employee's contribution is voluntary or mandatory.").
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E. Defaults on Pension Obligations and Sovereign Immunity
If a state defaults on public-pension funding or unilaterally
changes the terms of a pension contract, its actions raise fundamental
issues concerning the state's legal obligations and the immutability of
its sovereign immunity. One can ask to what extent a state is legally
obligated to fund its public pension when it is functionally insolvent,
and how much does its sovereign immunity protect the state from
judicial intervention.
Although infrequent, states have defaulted on debtsior
Bondholders have brought claims against states for violating terms of
contracts and not paying debts, and in response, some states claimed
sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment of the
Constitution. 7 Under the Eleventh Amendment, federal judicial
power "shall not extend to suits brought against states by citizens of
another states, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state."'a In
Hans v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court extended the doctrine of such
sovereign immunity, holding that the Eleventh Amendment barred
federal suit even by citizens of that defendant state.i" The theory is
that states, like the federal government, are sovereign and cannot be
sued unless they allow themselves to be sued, and then only to the
extent they allow themselves to be sued.
Current Supreme Court jurisprudence interprets state immunity
to include the protection of a nonconsenting state from suit in state as
well as federal courts. In a five-to-four ruling, the Court concluded
that Article I of the United States Constitution does not provide
Congress with the ability to subject nonconsenting states to private
suits for damages in its own courts.o Modern-day state constitutions
and statutory laws, however, can and often do overcome that
106. See generally, B. U. RATCHFORD, AMERICAN STATE DEBTS (Duke Univ. Press
1941). For more detailed information on states debts in the 1800s, see WILLIAM A.
ScoTT, THE REPUDIATION OF STATE DEBTS 265-74 (Richard T Ely ed., Thomas Y.
Crowell & Co. 1893).
107. Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. 527, 529 (1857) ("It is an established principle of
jurisprudence in all civilized nations that the sovereign cannot be sued in its own courts, or
in any other, without its consent and permission . . .
108. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
109. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 17, 20 (1890).
110. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999) ("[A]s the Constitution's structure, its
history, and the authoritative interpretations by this Court make clear, the States'
immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed
before the ratification of the Constitution, and which they retain today. . . .").
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immunity, allowing state employees to sue the state for claims related
to public pensions.
Major downturns in the economy of the United States proceeded
the times when states have defaulted. Of the twenty-eight states and
territories existing in the 1840s, eight states and the territory of
Florida defaulted on their debt, with five of them repudiating all or
part of their debts in years following the Financial Panic of 1837."' In
response to these financial fallouts, some states passed constitutional
amendments that instituted procedural restrictions on state debts."2
After the costly and debt-laden years of the Civil War, eight states
defaulted to varying degrees in the 1870s and 1880s: Alabama,
Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Tennessee, and West Virginia."' This time many states
responded by passing repudiation acts between 1870 and 1880." The
last time that a state defaulted on its bonds was 1933, when Arkansas
defaulted on transportation-related bonds in the aftermath of the
Great Depression."' Many states have passed debt-limiting and
budget-balancing laws that, at least in theory, limit their abilities to
accumulate debt and encourage paying current bills such as pension
obligations.
States have generally waived their sovereign immunity to allow
their employees to sue them on issues of pension obligations. In
states where courts have interpreted pension obligations under
theories of contract or property rights, public employees as collective
bargaining units have come to rely on strong judicial protections
against attempts by states to make impairing changes to terms of
111. John Joseph Wallis, Sovereign Default and Repudiation: The Emerging Market-
Market in United States, 1839-1843, 2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No.
10753, 2004), http://www.econ.umd.edu/research/papers (search for "Wallis, Sovereign
Default and Repudiation"). The states eventually settled most of these debts, usually with
partial payments, after long battles in state legislatures as well as state and federal courts.
William B. English, Understanding the Costs of Sovereign Default: American States Debts
in the 1840's, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 259,259 (1996). For more detailed information on states
debts in the 1800s, see SCOTr, supra note 106, at 265-74.
112. John Joseph Wallis & Barry R. Weingast, Dysfunctional or Optimal Institutions?
State Debt Limitations, the Structure of State and Local Governments, and the Finance of
American Infrastructure, in FISCAL CHALLENGES: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH
TO BUDGET POL'Y 331-656 (Elizabeth Garrett, Elizabeth Graddy, & Howell E. Jackson
eds., 2006).
113. RATCHFORD, supra note 106, at 183-96.
114. SCOrr, supra note 106, at 221.
115. Joe Mysak, Bond Default Is About Too Much Debt, Too Little Time,
BLOOMBERG, Jul. 20, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-21/bond-default-
means-too-much-debt-too-little-time-commentary-by-joe-mysak.html.
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public pensions. It is unclear how insolvent a state must be before a
court might consider any impairment to pension benefits to be
reasonable and necessary. Equally unclear is how financially
desperate a state would need to be before it declared its sovereign
immunity against a court order requiring the state to honor the terms
of its pension obligations.
III. Solution Using Conditional Bailouts through
Tax-Exempt Debt Obligations
States in financial crisis are seeking financial solutions including
federal bailouts to states' current as well as projected long-term
pension indebtedness."' One proposed solution to the underfunding
involves state-issued pension-obligation bonds. The federal
government would grant tax-exempt status conditioned on changes to
the pensions of new employees.
A. Pension-Obligation Bonds Conditioned on Pension Plan Changes
The question of whether the federal government should bail out
state pensions has sparked fierce debates among media pundits,
financial analysts, and lawmakers. Outraged and frustrated by the
billions of economic-stimulus dollars already sent to states since 2008,
opponents of federal bailouts for state pension funds have declared
that "the era of the bailout is over."" 7  Other opponents, including
lawmakers like House Majority Leader Eric Cantor, suggest that any
type of federal bailout will only further delay states from fixing their
pension problems." Still others like Jon Shure of the Center on
116. States have fewer legal or practical remedies for debt relief from pension or other
liabilities than local and federal levels of government have. They cannot declare
bankruptcy as municipalities can. U.S. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (West
2011). The federal bankruptcy statute sets forth the preconditions for a municipality to
file bankruptcy, including the requirement of specific state authorization. 11 U.S.C. § 109
(West 2011). The states also cannot print additional money as Congress can under the
constitutional power to borrow, coin money, and regulate the value of money. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5. In February 2011, New Jersey Governor Christie told voters in his
State of the State message that "[w]e can't continue to spend money we don't have. We
can't print money, and we can't run deficits." Fletcher, supra note 3, at A17.
117. Barbara Barrett, 'The Era of the Bailout is Over,' Rep. McHenry Warns States,
CHARLOTrE OBSERVER, Feb. 10, 2011, http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2011/02/10/
2049471/the-era-of-the-bailout-is-over.html (reporting the declaration of Rep. Patrick
McHenry, who was chairing his first meeting of the House Oversight Committee's
subcommittee on TARP, Financial Services and Bailouts of Public and Private Programs
on February 9, 2011).
118. Alan Fram, Lawmakers Oppose Using Federal Money to Bail Out States and
Local Govts in Fiscal Trouble, ABC NEWS, Feb. 9, 2011, http://abcnews.go.com
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Budget and Policy Priorities assert that the plight of state pension
plans is being exaggerated." 9  They believe that the growth of
financial markets will eventually solve the underfunding problem,
given several years to remedy the shortfalls.1 20
Proponents and opponents of state bailouts at least agree that
state pensions are underfunded and states are struggling to balance
their budgets. Some states continue to have significant underfunding
and it appears that some states might be pressed to request more
federal assistance. For example, with his 2012 state budget proposal,
Illinois Governor Pat Quinn suggested that his state might seek a
federal guarantee for future pension-obligation bond sales, which
would allow the state to sell bonds at lower interest rates.121
An alternative to Quinn's proposed federal-guaranteed bonds
and likely a longer term solution to pension underfunding involves
pension-obligation bonds with significant conditions upon a state to
receive preferred tax-exempt status for those bonds. 122  Professors
Robert Novy-Marx and Joshua Rauh proposed a federal bailout
solution where a state issues state bonds that Congress would exempt
from federal income tax in exchange for the state agreeing to specific
austerity measures.123  For example, the state could issue tax-
subsidized pension funding bonds for a term such as fifteen years, and
would close its defined-benefit plan to new hires.124  The state then
would offer new employees a defined-contribution plan similar to a
/Business/wireStory?id=12875638; Corey Boles & Siobhan Hughes, No State Bailouts,
Lawmaker Says, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014
24052748703555804576102502825849450.html.
119. Dan Froomkin, 'Something's Got to Give': Massive Pension Fund Shortfalls
Threaten to Bankrupt States, HUFFINGTON POST, Sept. 15, 2010, http://www.huffington
post.com/2010/04/05/somethings-got-to-give-ma-n_525860.html.
120. Id.
121. GOVERNOR PAT QUINN, ILLINOIS STATE BUDGET FISCAL YEAR 2012 29
(2012), available at http://www2.ilinois.gov/budget/Documents/FY%202012/FY12
OperatingBudget.pdf. See Dave McKinney, Top U.S. House Republican Rejects Federal
Guarantee for Ill. Pensions, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 23, 2011, http://www.suntimes.
com/news/politics/3959464-418/top-u.s.-house-republican-rejects-federal-guarantee-for-ill.-
pensions.
122. Joshua Rauh & Robert Novy-Marx, Pension Security Bonds: A New Plan to
Address the State Pension Crisis, 7 ECONOMISTS' VOICE 2 (2010), http://www.bepress.
com/ev/vol7/iss3/artl.
123. Id. Under current federal law, state bonds funding pensions are fully taxable. Id.
As a result, these bonds are significantly more expensive than municipal bonds qualifying
for tax-exempt status. Id. See Role of Public Employee Pensions-statement of Joshua
Rauh, supra note 5, at 10.
124. Rauh & Novy-Marx, Pension Security Bonds, supra note 122, at 2.
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federal thrift savings plan with guaranteed access to social security.125
Additionally, the state would agree to fund its existing defined-
benefit plans on an actuarially sound basis.126 The advantage to the
state is that it could sell pension-obligation bonds at lower interest
rates competitive with those of tax-exempt municipal bonds. 27
B. Passing the Conditional-Spending Test of South Dakota v. Dole
Under the proposed solution of state bonds with federal
conditions, Congress would give tax-exempt status to pension-
obligation bonds only where a state meets three conditions. First, a
state must close its current defined-benefit pension plans to new
employees. Second, a state must close its defined-benefit pensions to
new employees. Third, a state must guarantee an actuarially sound
funding of its current defined-benefit plan. These conditional pension
obligation bonds appear to fall within the conditional federal
spending power of Congress. Courts have interpreted the almost
unlimited spending power of Congress under the Constitution's
Spending Power Clause" to include conditional federal spending to
persuade states to change their laws.
In South Dakota v. Dole, the Court adopted a four-prong test
against which it assessed the constitutionality of spending conditions
such as the ones in the proposal for tax-exempt pension-obligation
bonds.2 9 First, the spending must be for the "general welfare,"
125. Id.
126. Role of Public Employee Pensions-statement of Joshua Rauh, supra note 5, at
10. Rauh argues that enrolling state and local workers into Social Security would offset a
significant percentage of the federal government's costs from the debt subsidy. Id. See
also Peter A. Diamond & Peter R. Orszag, Saving Social Security: The Diamond-Orszag
Plan, 2 ECONOMISTS' VOICE 3 (2005), http://www.bepress.comlev/vol2/iss1l/art8
(suggesting that moving newly hired state government workers into the social security
system will help restore social security and move towards all workers bearing their fair
share of the nation's legacy generosity to retired workers). But see Rowland Davis,
Comment on Rauh and Novy-Marx: The Real Cost to Provide Adequate Retirement
Benefits, 7 ECONOMISTS' VOICE 1 (2010), http://www.bepress.comlev/vol7/iss4/art1
(asserting that Rauh and Novy-Marx has significantly under-estimated the cost for a
replacement defined-contribution plan).
127. Role of Public Employee Pensions-statement of Joshua Rauh, supra note 5, at
10.
128. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1 ("The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common
Defence and general Welfare of the United States .... ).
129. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (holding that receipt of highway
funds conditioned on the state establishing a minimum drinking age was constitutional
under the spending power of Congress).
although "courts should defer substantially to the judgment of
Congress"'m because "the concept of welfare or the opposite is
shaped by Congress.""' Second, Congress's imposed conditions on a
state's receipt of funds must be "unambiguous."132 Third, conditions
on federal grants must be reasonably related to "the federal interest
in particular national projects or programs."'33 Finally, the legislation
should not violate any independent "constitutional provisions . . .
[that] provide an independent bar to the conditional grant of federal
funds."'" In South Dakota v. Dole, the Court concluded that
conditioned receipt of federal highway funds on a state's adoption of
a twenty-one-year-old drinking age was sufficiently related to the
f d* 135funding program.
Congressional tax expenditure on tax-exempt pension-obligation
bonds will likely pass the general-welfare prong of the South Dakota
v. Dole test because Congress has wide discretion on what constitutes
general welfare, and the federal interest in stabilizing public pensions
of states seems to meet that low threshold requirement.13
Under the lack-of-ambiguity prong, a program imposing
conditions upon tax-exempt status for bonds would likely clear the
hurdle that conditional spending is free from ambiguity, assuming
Congress clearly defines actuarially sound pension-funding levels.
The state would need to be able to evaluate the pros and cons of
receiving tax-exempt treatment on pension-obligation bonds in
exchange for moving their pensions from defined-benefit to defined-
130. Id.
131. Id. at 207 (quoting Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640-45 (1937)).
132. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
133. Id. (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978) (plurality
opinion)). The dissenting Justice O'Connor agreed in principle with the South Dakota v.
Dole test but disagreed with the Court's application. Dole, 483 U.S. at 212. She thought
that the conditioned federal highway grant is unconstitutional because the "establishment
of a minimum drinking age of 21 is not sufficiently related to interstate highway
construction to justify so conditioning funds appropriated for that purpose." Id. Rather, it
was "an attempt to regulate the sale of liquor, an attempt that lies outside Congress'
power to regulate commerce." Id.
134. Id. at 208 (citing Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist., 469 U.S. 256,
269-70 (1985); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 91 (1976) (per curiam); King v. Smith, 392
U.S. 309, 333, n.34 (1968)).
135. Dole, 483 U.S. at 212.
136. In Helvering v. Davis, Judge Cardozo explained that this discretion "belongs to
Congress, unless the choice is clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise
of judgment." 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937). He also suggested that old-age pension with
regards to Social Security was a national problem and "separate states cannot deal with it
effectively." Id. at 644.
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contribution plans. The state would need to evaluate the additional
costs to implement a new defined-contribution plan and might
determine that the costs of complying with the conditions outweigh
the benefits.""
Under the reasonably related prong, the conditional federal tax
subsidy of pension-obligation bonds appears reasonably related to the
federal interest in stabilizing the funding of public-pension
programs.13 Arguably, the federal tax subsidy of pension obligation
bonds and public-pension funding are more closely related than
highway funds and a state's minimum legal drinking age, which the
South Dakota v. Dole Court found sufficiently related.
Under the fourth prong, the conditional grant of a tax subsidy fits
within the Court's broad interpretation of Congress's power under
the Spending Clause,"' and does not appear to violate any other
constitutional rights the states or pensioners might have. Absent
evidence of coercion, "Congress may attach conditions on the receipt
of federal funds . .. that bear some relationship to the purpose of the
federal spending. . . .""
Under South Dakota v. Dole, tax-exempt pension obligation
bonds with federally imposed conditions appear constitutional. This
assumes they are unambiguous in their creation and implementation,
they promote the general welfare of the country, and they reasonably
relate to the federal interest in the nation's overall financial health.
Nevertheless, a state might try to argue that strong conditions of
closing up defined-contribution plans for new employees in exchange
for receiving tax-exempt status for bonds is coercive in nature and
impinges upon state autonomy. The counterargument is that states
would not be required to participate in a tax-exempt program for
bonds, and would be free to issue federally taxed rather than tax-
exempt pension-obligation bonds.
The Court recognizes Congress's broad discretion in its spending
and conditional spending. Thus, conditional debt obligations for state
pensions would likely survive a constitutional challenge because the
137. Some states such as Michigan and Alaska have closed their defined-benefit plans
to new employees and have offered them a defined-contribution plan. RONALD SNELL,
NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE DEFINED CONTRIBUTION AND HYBRID
PENSION PLANS 4 (2010), http://www.ncsl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=yGsmFhwoq
7E%3D&tabid=18511.
138. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (quoting Massachusetts, 435 U.S. at 461 (plurality opinion)).
139. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
140. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992) (quoting Dole, 483 U.S. at
206) (internal quotations omitted).
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conditions on the pensions that increase the probability of the state
paying the pension-bond obligations seem reasonably related to the
preferential tax treatment of the bonds funding those pensions.
IV. Solution Involving Bankruptcy for States
A more radical and controversial proposal for solving states'
budget crises and pension obligations includes bankruptcy relief.
Congress could pass laws to allow bankruptcy relief for states.
Bankruptcy law already allows local governments such as cities and
counties to declare bankruptcy. Arguably, Congress could extend
bankruptcy relief to states because the Bankruptcy Clause of the
Constitution gives Congress sweeping powers to implement "uniform
Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States."l41
A. Issue of State Autonomy with Bankruptcy for States
A threshold question is whether the Bankruptcy Clause of the
Constitution provides Congress the power to abrogate state sovereign
immunity within the bankruptcy context. To some extent, the
Bankruptcy Clause may be viewed as a powerful but limited
exception to the principles of federalism and state autonomy, which
are implied by the structure of the Constitution and expressly stated
in the Tenth Amendment. As such, the Bankruptcy Clause permits
and sometimes compels exceptions to constitutional provisions like
that of the Contract Clause. The exception is available, however,
only when the exigencies of financial distress require the federal
government to provide a last resort for a debtor.
In principle, bankruptcy for states should be used only as a
state's last resort. Proponents of the institution of bankruptcy argue
that the proposed bankruptcy law for states would preempt all
conflicting state law just as municipal bankruptcy law has. Yet some
legal analysts assert that the sovereign immunity of states remains an
insurmountable constitutional barrier.142 Further, they offer more
practical warnings about lengthy legal battles, administrative
141. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
142. See, e.g., The Role of Public Employee Pensions in Contributing to State
Insolvency and the Possibility of a State Bankruptcy Chapter: Hearing Before the H.
Subcomm. on Courts, Commercial, and Administrative Law, 112th Cong. 54 (2011)
[hereinafter Role of Public Employee Pensions-statement of James E. Spiotto]
(statement of James E. Spiotto, Partner of Chapman and Cutler LLP), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/112th/1 12-25_64585.PDF.
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difficulties, political realities, and the spread of financial-market
turmoil.'43
While the constitutionality of state bankruptcy is fiercely
debated, municipal bankruptcy has been accepted as constitutional
for over seventy years. In the past seventy years municipalities have
been allowed with state consent to voluntarily file for bankruptcy. If
the proposed bankruptcy law ensures that creditors cannot force a
state into bankruptcy and states must voluntarily file, the Supreme
Court still would need to determine whether the bankruptcy law
impermissibly treads on states' sovereign immunity and whether a
limitation on an Article I power protects that "incident of state
sovereignty."'44
Even after two hundred years, debates persist on the scope of
power that the United States Constitution gives the federal
government. The Supreme Court, in interpreting this scope of power,
has set forth limits on federal power, basing them on constitutional
text or on the general federalism principle of respecting states'
sovereignty implied by the Constitution's structure as a whole.
"[T]he Tenth Amendment confirms that the power of the Federal
Government is subject to limits that may, in a given instance, reserve
power to the States.",4 1
The Supreme Court held in New York v. United Statesl46 that
Congress cannot compel the states to enact or enforce a particular
provision of a federal regulatory program. The Court found in this
case that the federal "take-title" provision that made New York liable
for damages if the state failed to take possession of low-level
radioactive waste was coercive and therefore unconstitutional.147 The
Court analyzed the state's alternatives to either take title to the waste
or become liable for damages. It explained, "A choice between two
unconstitutionally coercive regulatory techniques is no choice at
all." 48
Under the anti-commandeering doctrine, the federal government
cannot impose targeted, affirmative, coercive duties upon state
legislators or executive officials. In Printz v. United States, Congress
had passed interim provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence
143. Id.
144. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 157.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 188.
147. Id. at 176.
148. Id.
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Prevention Act that required state and local officers to conduct
background checks on prospective handgun purchases and perform
certain related tasks.149 The Court found that these interim provisions
were unconstitutional because Congress stepped over the
constitutional line when it compelled certain executive actions that
should have remained in the purview of the states.' The conclusion
is that "[the Federal Government may neither issue directives
requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the
States' officers . . . to administer or enforce a federal regulatory
program.""' Thus, if Congress directed a state to declare bankruptcy,
it would be unconstitutional coercion under the anti-commandeering
doctrine.
In a hypothetical bankruptcy of a state, a federal bankruptcy
court still might appear to be directing a state's actions in violation of
the anti-commandeering principle. Any action that Congress could
take to direct a state to declare bankruptcy as unconstitutional
coercion. The analysis requires determinations on "whether an Act
of Congress [such as instituting bankruptcy law for states] is
authorized by one of the powers delegated to Congress in Article I of
the Constitution [and] whether an Act of Congress invades the
province of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment."15
The Bankruptcy Clause in Article I of the Constitution gives the
Congress broad powers to enact "uniform Laws on the subject of
Bankruptcies throughout the United States."'53 On its face, the
Bankruptcy Clause does not preclude the application of federal
bankruptcy laws to states. Yet bankruptcy for states opens up the
possibility that the federal government could interfere with core state
functions and thereby violate a state's sovereignty under the Tenth
Amendment.'" Further, the structure of the Constitution implies that
states possess a degree of autonomy in governing themselves, and
their management of their financial affairs would seem to be integral
to that autonomy.'55  The proper scope of this autonomous
governance can be debated."'
149. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 902 (1997).
150. Id at 925.
151. Printz, 521 U.S. at 935.
152. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 155.
153. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4.
154. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
155. The Constitution's structure reveals a principle of "dual sovereignty" between the
federal and state levels of government. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457
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Competing interests are in play here. On the one hand, the
Tenth Amendment guarantees that power is reserved for the states.
On the other hand, the Supremacy Clause supports the supremacy of
federal bankruptcy. Congress likely would need to include a
statutory provision within the proposed bankruptcy law for states
similar to, although possibly more limited than, the one for
municipalities in Chapter Nine, Section 903 of the Bankruptcy
Code.' It says, "This chapter does not limit or impair the power of a
State to control, by legislation or otherwise, a municipality of or in
such State in the exercise of the political or governmental powers of
such municipality ....
Assuming that a state wishes to voluntarily declare bankruptcy,
the next question is whether the federal government would be
commandeering the state's power to govern itself where the federal
bankruptcy court directs the bankruptcy proceedings. While
bankruptcy code for states is only hypothetical here, current
municipal bankruptcy law and procedures provides a framework for
analysis to evaluate the constitutionality of bankruptcy for states and
how a bankruptcy court might treat unfunded pension obligations as
part of the debts of a bankrupt state.
B. Municipal Bankruptcy as a Model for Proposed State Bankruptcy
Current municipal bankruptcy law offers a statutory framework
upon which a proposed bankruptcy code for states likely would be
(1991). Similar to the concerns for balance of power on the federal level, the limitations
on a state government being sued in its own courts helps prevent the state's judiciary from
having too much power over the legislative and executive branches of the state. If it were
otherwise, the legislative and executive branches might be limited in its ability to
apportion scarce resources based on the will of its citizens, and to protect the state's
financial integrity.
156. This increasing federal power relative to state power is represented in the growing
percentage of the gross national product devoted to federal and states-government
expenditures. JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN, U.S.
SENATOR CONNIE MACK, THE U.S. ECONOMY AT THE BEGINNING AND END OF THE
20TH CENTURY 21 (1999), http://usinfo.org/enus/economy/overview/docs/century.pdf.
The federal government's expenditures grew four fold, from two to five percent of gross
national product (GDP) early in the twentieth century to around twenty percent of GDP
early in twenty-first century. Id. Meanwhile, the states' expenditures did not quite double
during the same period from five percent of GDP early in the twentieth century to around
nine percent of GDP early in the twenty-first century. Id.
157. 11 U.S.C. § 903 (West 2011).
158. 11 U.S.C. § 903. See also Ryan Preston Dahl, Collective Bargaining Agreements
and Chapter 9 Bankruptcy, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 295, 329-38 (2007) (noting that
"constitutional guarantees of state sovereignty are not violated by a municipal debtor's
independent exercise of bankruptcy-specific rights").
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built. This is because the general structure and debts of
municipalities are more analogous to those of local governments than
those of individuals or business entities. Further, the court's
experience with municipal bankruptcies shows how bankruptcy-for-
states might work and what its limitations would be.
When municipalities are unable to pay their bills, they may
declare bankruptcy voluntarily under Chapter Nine of the federal
Bankruptcy Code.'59  Congress instituted bankruptcy for
municipalities after the Great Depression when a number of cities
were steeped in debt and needed a vehicle to reorganize that debt.6
The Supreme Court held the law constitutional and rejected the
arguments of municipal bondholders that the bankruptcy law violated
the Fifth and Tenth Amendments of the Federal Constitution. 6 1
1. Early Constitutional Challenges to Municipal Bankruptcy
The municipal bankruptcy laws passed in the 1930s met fierce
constitutional challenges, and proposed bankruptcy laws for states
meet similar opposition. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court might
ultimately find bankruptcy law for states constitutional in a severe
financial depression, for the same reasons it found the Municipal
Bankruptcy Act of 1937162 constitutional in Bekins v. Lindsay-
Strathmore Irr. Dist.'
159. 11 U.S.C. §§ 901-946 (West 2011). The law was introduced as Chapter Ten of the
Bankruptcy Code but is now Chapter Nine.
160. The first municipal bankruptcy legislation was enacted in 1934 during the Great
Depression. Pub. L. No. 73-251, 48 Stat. 798 (1934). Although Congress took care to draft
the legislation so as not to interfere with the sovereign powers of the states guaranteed by
the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution, the Supreme Court held the 1934 Act
unconstitutional as an improper interference with the sovereignty of the states. Ashton v.
Cameron County Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513, 532 (1936). Congress
enacted a revised Municipal Bankruptcy Act in 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-302, 50 Stat. 653
(1937), which was upheld by the Supreme Court. United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 54
(1938), reh'g. denied, 304 U.S. 589 (1938).
161. Bekins, 304 U.S. at 46.
162. An Act to Amend an Act Entitled "An Act to Establish a Uniform System of
Bankruptcy Throughout the United States," Pub. L. No. 75-302, 50 Stat. 653 (1937). The
term "Bankruptcy Code" refers to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. Bankruptcy Act,
Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978). Eric W. Lam, Municipal Bankruptcy: The
Problem With Chapter 9 Eligibility-A Proposal to Amend 11 U.S.C. § 109(c) (2) (1988), 22
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 625, 625 (1990). This enactment became effective October 1, 1979. 92 Stat.
at 2682. Id. In 1984, a major amendment was made to the Code. Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98
Stat. 333, 364 (1984). Id. Another amendment was made in 1986. Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100
Stat. 3088, 3097 (1986). Id.
163. Bekins, 304 U.S. at 27.
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In 1938, the Bekins Court gave several key reasons why it found
the municipal bankruptcy law to be constitutional. First, municipal
bankruptcy like the Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation District declared
was limited in scope to voluntary proceedings on "the composition of
debts," and "it is well settled that a proceeding for composition is in
its nature within the federal bankruptcy power."'
Second, the municipality entered into the proceedings voluntarily
and with the consent of California, as sufficiently evidenced in a state
statute passed in 1934.16' Third, the bankruptcy proceedings of the
District did not "unconstitutional[ly] interfere[e] with the essential
independence of the State as preserved by the Constitution. ,166 The
Court explained the limited scope of the bankruptcy court's power:
"The bankruptcy power is exercised in relation to a matter normally
within its province and only in a case where the action of the
[insolvent Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation District] in carrying out a
plan of composition approved by the bankruptcy court is authorized
by state law."167 The Court also found no merit in the bondholders'
objections under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment
bankruptcy because the bankruptcy gave effect to a voluntary
arrangement to restructure the municipality's debt, under which
payment is reduced.168
In the earlier Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement
Dist. No. 1 decision, the Supreme Court also had assumed that the
similar Municipal Bankruptcy Act of 19346 did not contravene the
Fifth Amendment."o Nevertheless, it held the Act unconstitutional
because the sovereignty of the state and its subdivisions would no
longer exist if the Court allowed the federal government to
"interferefe] with the relations between the parties concerned-to
change, modify, or impair the obligation of their contracts."71
As a contemporary of the justices deciding Bekins and Ashton,
Professor Reuschlein observed that the Ashton Court feared that the
164. Id. at 47.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 49.
167. Id. at 51.
168. Id.
169. Municipal Bankruptcy Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-251, 48 Stat. 798 (1934), was
substantially similar to the Municipal Bankruptcy Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-302, 50 Stat.
653 (1937), which the Court found constitutional. Bekins, 304 U.S. at 51.
170. Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513, 527
(1936).
171. Id. at 530.
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scope of the Bankruptcy Clause would expand to bankruptcy for
states, and thus destroy the sovereignty of states, making them submit
to the will of the Congress.17 In the Bekins and Ashton cases, the
Court was not required to decide on the possibility of state
bankruptcy,' although Justice James Clark McReynolds cautioned
that it was the next logical step. He asks in the Ashton opinion, "If
federal bankruptcy laws can be extended to [the municipality], why
not to the state?" 174
Professor Reuschlein thought that with the municipal bankruptcy
laws the Court's "fear of vanishing state lines seem[ed] rather
unwarranted."' Yet now, some seven decades later, the public
concern about federalism, dual sovereignty, and the sovereign
immunity of states has reappeared in public debates on whether
bankruptcy law should be expanded to states.
To the Ashton Court's concern on the implications of municipal
bankruptcy on federalism and state autonomy, the dissenting Justice
Cardozo suggested that a state's consent preserves the equilibrium
between national and state power.16 He concluded that municipal
bankruptcy should be constitutional because, assuming it is voluntary
and absent coercion, it impedes state autonomy no more than federal
taxes do.'"
2. Current Jurisprudence for Municipal Bankruptcy
With now more than seventy years of municipal bankruptcy
experience, federal bankruptcy courts have developed judicial and
procedural standards for municipal bankruptcy that have withstood
constitutional challenges. The Supreme Court has concluded that
where state law "unduly impede[s] the operation of federal
bankruptcy policy, the state law [will] have to yield."17 ' This is
because the Supremacy Clause invalidates state laws that "interfere
172. Harold Gill Reuschlein, Municipal Debt Readjustment: Present Relief and Future
Policy, 23 CORNELL L.Q. 365, 377 (1938).
173. Id. at 377-78.
174. Ashton, 298 U.S. at 530. Justice McReynolds postulated that "[i]f the state were
proceeding under a [bankruptcy] statute like the present one, with terms broad enough to
include her, . . . the problem [of interfering with the sovereignty of the state] would not be
materially different." Id.
175. Reuschlein, supra note 172, at 377.
176. Ashton, 298 U.S. at 540.
177. Id. at 540-41.
178. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 649 (1971).
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with, or are contrary to the laws of Congress.""'9 Under current
jurisprudence, at least at the municipal level, a debtor's independent
exercise of bankruptcy-specific rights does not appear to violate
constitutional guarantees of state sovereignty.
The judicial and procedural standards for any proposed
provisions for state bankruptcy likely would be challenged on similar
grounds to those present in municipality bankruptcy. These
standards if applied to the state would require that the state 1) had
negotiated unsuccessfully but in good faith with creditors;'" 2) is
insolvent, as defined by cash flow rather than assets and liabilities;"'
3) has specific law that recognizes the validity of bankruptcy for the
state;" 4) acts voluntarily and without coercion;"' 5) remains
autonomous in its general governance, politics, and other fiscal affairs
throughout the bankruptcy proceedings;'" and 6) gives final approval
to the bankruptcy plan." Underlying these standards are two
themes: state autonomy buttressed by constitutional structure and the
Tenth Amendment, and good-faith dealing with creditors implied
within the Contract Clause.
Assuming that the structure of bankruptcy for states would be
similar to that of municipalities, the Bankruptcy Court could not
interfere with the revenue, politics, or day-to-day operations of a
179. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 211 (1824).
180. 11 U.S.C. § 921(c) (West 2011) ("[T]he court, after notice and a hearing, may
dismiss the petition if the debtor did not file the [bankruptcy] petition in good faith.").
181. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(3) (West 2011).
182. 11 U.S.C. § 903(1) (West 2011). The state must "specifically authorize" localities
within the state to enter Chapter Nine, with or without conditions. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2)
(West 2011). Nevertheless, a general statute that authorizes localities within the state to
enter Chapter Nine, with or without conditions, will suffice. See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE §
53760 (West 2011).
In 1994, Congress changed the 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) to require that a municipality be
"specifically authorized" by its state to file under Chapter Nine from the previous legal
requirement that a municipality be "generally authorized." 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2). Daniel
J. Freyberg, Comment, Municipal Bankruptcy and Express State Authorization to be a
Chapter 9 Debtor: Current State Approaches to Municipal Insolvency - and What Will
States Do Now?, 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1001 (1997). In In re County of Orange, the court
noted that the purported state grant of authority "must be exact, plain, and direct with
well-defined limits so that nothing is left to inference or implication." 183 B.R. 594, 604
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995).
183. 11 U.S.C. § 903 (West 2011).
184. 11 U.S.C. § 904 (West 2011) (explicitly barring the court, without the consent of
the debtor municipality, from interfering with any of the municipality's political or
governmental powers, any of its property or revenues, or its use or enjoyment of any
income-producing properties).
185. 11 U.S.C. § 943(a) (West 2011).
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state. In East St. Louis v. Zebley,' the Supreme Court held that "the
question, what expenditures are proper and necessary for the
municipal administration, is not judicial; it is confided by law to the
discretion of the municipal authorities. No court has the right to
control that discretion."17 To the Court, the level of expenditures
appeared to be an inherently political issue, not susceptible to
scientific and disinterested evaluation."' In this way, it would violate
structural principles of federalism and separation of powers for
federal courts to interfere with local democratic decision-making
about levels of spending. 89 For the same reason, the Bankruptcy
Court could not interfere with the revenue, politics, or day-to-day
operations of a state if it were to declare bankruptcy.
3. Public-Pension Obligations in Collective Bargaining Agreements
Bankruptcy can only be an effective tool against the state's
insolvency if it addresses the liabilities of public pensions, which are
becoming a significant portion of many states' unpaid bills. Public
pensions at the state or local level of government are often part of
collective bargaining agreements or other types of labor contracts.
These agreements between labor unions and states often have
additional protections against impairments under state statutory or
constitutional law." Consequently, the critical question here
becomes whether bankruptcy law for states would allow them to
reject collective bargaining agreements related to its public-pension
obligations.
Again, using municipal bankruptcy as a model, the municipal
bankruptcy code does not specifically address labor contracts or
pension obligations as part of those contracts. Yet it allows full access
to Chapter Nine bankruptcy relief under 11 U.S.C. § 903,"' together
186. City of East St. Louis v. Zebley, 110 U.S. 321, 324 (1884).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. For example, Illinois's state constitution says "Membership in any pension or
retirement system of the State . . . shall be an enforceable contractual relationship, the
benefits of which shall not be diminished or impaired." ILL. CONST. art. XIII, § 5 (1970).
A majority of Illinois cases have held that the constitutional provision "prohibits
subsequent amendments to the law from decreasing a party's pension benefits, but allows
pension benefits to be enhanced by a subsequent amendment on the theory that a new
contract with the increased vested benefits is formed if the party provides additional
consideration in the form of continued contributions." Hannigan v. Hoffmeister, 608
N.E.2d 396, 402 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
191. 11 U.S.C. § 903 (West 2011).
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with 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2).'9 ' Arguably, once the municipality and its
state agree to the municipality declaring bankruptcy, the municipality
can fully use 11 U.S.C. § 365 to accept or reject its executory
contracts.1 93
Collective bargaining agreements and their agreed-upon pension
terms by extension, are included in the definition of executory
contracts, and thus may be subject to modifications in bankruptcy. 94
In NLRB v. Bildisco, the Supreme Court affirmed the bankruptcy's
decision that a building supplies distributor had a right to reject a
collective bargaining agreement in Chapter Eleven bankruptcy
(reorganization) because it had made reasonable efforts to negotiate
a voluntary modification of its labor contract prior to bankruptcy.195
The Court concluded this after it recognized the special nature of the
collective bargaining agreement and the consequent "law of the
shop," and distinguished the collective agreement from an ordinary
executory contract. It applied a somewhat stricter standard than that
of "business judgment" to the rejection of the collective bargaining
agreement, and found in this case, the employer's rejection of the
collective bargaining agreement to be reasonable when the company
faced liquidation."
In the end, a bankruptcy court must balance the interests of the
debtor, creditors, and employees, and in striking the balance, must
consider not only the degree of hardship each party faces, but also
any qualitative differences between the types of hardship each may
faces.'" That balance in bankruptcy might extend to breaking of a
collective bargaining agreement under 11 U.S.C. § 365.
In a hypothetical state bankruptcy, public pensions as part of
collective bargaining agreements would be subject to modification
under 11 U.S.C. § 365. The bankruptcy likely would apply the
Bildisco standard to any public-pension contract a state wants to
modify. That means the state could reject a pension contract with
state employees and retirees only if the agreement significantly
192. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (West 2011).
193. 11 U.S.C. § 901 (West 2011) (making § 365 fully applicable to municipality cases).
194. NLRB v. Bildisco and Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 523 n.6 (1984).
195. Id. See also Omer Kimhi, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Solution in Search
of a Problem, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 351, 360 (2010). In response to the Bildisco decision,
Congress added explicit protections for labor contracts into Chapter Eleven, which
governs reorganization of businesses but not for Chapter Nine, which governs municipal
bankruptcies. Id.
196. Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 525-26.
197. Id. at 526-27.
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burdened the state and the state was able show that it made
reasonable efforts to negotiate a voluntary modification to the
agreement without a satisfactory result. Under this standard, the
state might also apply greater pressure on their employees to make
concessions to pension contracts before deciding to declare
bankruptcy.
Bankruptcy brings all debts under the bankruptcy court's
scrutiny, and at least one creditor from every "impaired" class must
approve the bankruptcy plan voluntarily before any involuntary
losses or cuts (often called "cram downs") can be imposed. 98
Moreover, once a debtor files and is deemed eligible for bankruptcy,
any state law or constitutional provision that limits the provisions of
the Bankruptcy Code is preempted.'9
In the case of a state declaring bankruptcy, the state presumably
could not target pension benefits for cuts without also imposing losses
on other unsecured creditors under the structure of current
bankruptcy law. Conversely, the state likely could not exempt
pension benefits from cuts just because of additional state statutory or
constitutional provisions that protect pension contracts from
impairment. As a result, the "impaired" pension holders could
experience at least some financial loss. Additionally, their bargaining
unit or labor union would be required as one of the creditors to
approve the state's bankruptcy plan, which might include impairment
a pension contract.
4. The Best-Interest Standard for Bankruptcy Plans
Bankruptcy courts generally require that the municipal debtor is
unable to cover liabilities with available revenue before filing
bankruptcy, and that the municipality had tried to negotiate with its
creditors in good faith before filing bankruptcy. Again, assuming that
state bankruptcy code would follow the framework of municipal
bankruptcy code, the code would require a state to act fair and
equitably with the best interest of the creditors and the court would
198. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (West 2011) (outlining the requirements for judicial approval
of a plan).
199. As the court noted in the bankruptcy of the city of Vallejo, "[B]y authorizing the
use of Chapter 9 by its municipalities, California must accept Chapter 9 in its totality; it
cannot cherry pick what it likes while disregarding the rest. In re City of Vallejo, 403 B.R.
72, 76 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2009) (citing In re County of Orange, 191 B.R. 1005, 1021 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. 1996)).
290 [Vol. 39:1
Fall 20111 STATES, PUBLIC PENSIONS, AND THE CONSTITUTION
need to confirm that the state's bankruptcy plan complies with the
"fair and equitable" test and is in the best interests of the creditors.200
Some courts interpret the "best interests" or "fair and equitable"
to mean that they can reject confirmation proposals that do not
include feasible tax increases with reasonable possibility of increased
revenue. In 1940, for example, a federal appeals court rejected a
bankruptcy petition filed by Orange County's Newport Heights
Irrigation District on the grounds that the District had sufficient
assets and could have raised taxes to pay the interest due on its
bonds. 20' The court concluded that it was "unable to find any reason
why the tax rate should not have been increased sufficiently to meet
the District's obligations or why it can be said that the [bankruptcy]
plan is 'equitable' and 'fair' and for the 'best interest of the creditors'
with no sufficient showing that the taxing power was inadequate to
raise the taxes to pay them." 202
In contrast, a bankruptcy court concluded that a plan was
proposed in good faith where the debtor hospital demonstrated that it
could not raise taxes sufficient to pay more to creditors.203 After facts-
and-circumstances analysis, the court determined that a hospital
district had no obligation to raise taxes to pay unsecured claims in full
to demonstrate that its bankruptcy plan was proposed in good faith
and fair and equitable. 2 4 Additionally, the court recognized no
existing authority where the court could require a debtor to raise
taxes if the evidence indicated that not raising taxes would be
inequitable and unfair.205
A state bankruptcy code that follows the framework of municipal
bankruptcy code would require a state to act fairly and equitably with
the best interest of all of its creditors-not just its employees and
retirees with pensions. Decades of judicial rulings under Contract-
Clause analysis have protected most pensions of governmental
employees and retirees from reductions. Nevertheless, a bankruptcy
court might come to a different conclusion about what is fair and
200. The Revision and Legislative Reports following 11 U.S.C. § 943 suggest that a
court's confirmation of a bankruptcy plan should be guided by standards of "fair and
equitable" and the "best interest of creditors," as set forth in Kelley v. Everglades
Drainage Dist., 319 U.S. 415 (1943) and Fano v. Newport Heights Irrigation Dist., 114 F.2d
563 (9th Cir. 1940). 11 U.S.C. § 943 (West 2011).
201. Fano, 114 F.2d at 565-66.
202. Id.
203. In re Corcoran Hosp. Dist., 233 B.R. 449, 459 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1999).
204. Id. at 459-60.
205. Id. at 460 (citing Fano, 114 F.2d at 566).
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equitable for public-pension holders after a fact-and-circumstances
analysis of a state's overall financial health including the state's
budget deficit and its projected revenue and expenditures.
C. Issue of Greater Federal Interference with Bankruptcy for States
What will not been discussed here in any detail is how
bankruptcy for states implicates greater interference with their
sovereignty than municipal bankruptcy does because states ultimately
control whether the municipality can declare bankruptcy. Even
today, not all states grant municipalities the right to declare
bankruptcy under Chapter Nine.20
Those who question the constitutionality of bankruptcy for states
argue that no matter how narrowly the bankruptcy law is drafted to
prevent federal interference with state governance, such law
ultimately would strip the states of the "dignity and respect due
sovereign entities." 207  Arguably, states could become "mere
appendages of the federal government." 208 Additionally, if the state
legislature would declare bankruptcy or enter into a long-term
contract, it might bind future legislatures. A legislature should not be
able to bind its successors with contracts that the successor
determines is harmful to the public's safety, health or comfort, or are
not useful or necessary. The Supreme Court made clear in Stone v.
Mississippi that the "legislature cannot bargain away the police power
of a State." 20
206. Role of Public Employee Pensions-statement of James E. Spiotto, supra, note
142 at 4. Fifteen states have unconditionally authorized municipalities by statute to file
Chapter Nine petitions: ALA. CODE § 11-81-3 (West 2011); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 35-
603 (West 2011); ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-74-103 (West 2011); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 53760
(West 2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-3903 (West 2011); KY. REV. STAT ANN. § 66.400
(West 2011); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 471.831 (West 2011); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 427.100 (West
2011); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 7-7-132 and 85-7-2041 (West 2011); NEB. REV. STAT. § 13-
402 (West 2011); N.Y. LOCAL FIN. LAW § 85.80 (West 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62 §§
281, 283 (West 2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 6-1-10 (West 2011); TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE
ANN. § 140.00 (West 2011); WASH. REV. CODE § 39.64.040 (West 2011). Id. Twenty-six
states do not allow their municipalities to file for bankruptcy under Chapter Nine. John
Knox & Marc Levinson, MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY: AVOIDING AND USING CHAPTER 9
IN TIMES OF FISCAL STRESS 17 (Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP 2009), available at
http://www.orrick.com/fileupload/1736.pdf.
207. Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 769 (2002).
208. Fed. Maritime Comm'n, 535 U.S. at 751.
209. Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 817 (1879) (upholding a Mississippi statute
outlawing lotteries even though a prior legislature had granted to a private party the right
to run a lottery).
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Further, opponents of state bankruptcy law suggest that before
unfunded pension liabilities bring a state "to its knees in a bankruptcy
forum," more appropriate methods still exist for resolving problems
with states' potentially unrealistic promises made to state employees
and retirees. 210 These differences between municipal bankruptcy and
the proposed bankruptcy for states could be significant enough for
the Supreme Court to find that bankruptcy for states is untenable.
D. Practical Rather than Constitutional Limitations to Bankruptcy
Even if Congress establishes a new chapter of bankruptcy for
states and the Supreme Court finds it constitutional, states may
determine that on a practical level, declaring bankruptcy creates more
social, political and other economic problems than it solves. At a
fundamental economic level, bankruptcy provides debt relief. Yet a
state bankruptcy declaration could affect financial-market volatility
and an already weakened bond market, further damaging state credit
ratings and bondholder trust.211 So while bankruptcy may provide the
most financially troubled states with a new form of relief,212 many
state officials see more harm than good.213
Any state pursuing bankruptcy likely would be caught up in
lengthy and costly constitutional challenges of pension holders and
other interested parties. It is because of this legal uncertainty as well
as practical issues that bankruptcy may remain an unattractive option
for states. Thus, a state would only file bankruptcy in response to an
overwhelming liquidity crisis and as a last resort option when
everything else fails.
Conclusion
Whether the funding gap of state public pensions is $452 billion,
$2.54 trillion or somewhere in between, states' abilities to pay for
retirement benefits promised to public-sector workers may run up
against the reality of limited resources. Many states have been
210. Role of Public Employee Pensions-statement of James E. Spiotto, supra, note
142, at 4.
211. Joan Gralla, Jim Christie, Michael Connor & Lisa Lambert, Factbox: Big U.S.
States Spurn Bankruptcy Bill, REUTERS, Jan. 21, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/
2011/01/21/us-usa-states-bankruptcy-reaction-idUSTRE7OK78P20110121.
212. David Skeel, A Bankruptcy Law-Not Bailouts-for the States, WALL ST. J., Jan.
18, 2011, at A17, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870377970457
6073522930513118.html.
213. John Gramlich, 'No Thanks,' States Say to Bankruptcy Idea, STATELINE, Jan. 25,
2011, http://www.stateline.org/live/details/story?contentld=544565.
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running budget deficits for multiple years, even though most states
have statutory or constitutional provisions requiring some form of a
balanced budget. Thus, a state may be tempted to default on or
repudiate at least some of the current pension obligations.
Beyond the protections of the Constitution's Contract Clause,
state constitutional or statutory laws provide additional legal
protections against states unilaterally reducing pension benefits. A
financially strapped state likely will face stiff legal challenges to any
state action significantly impairing its public pensions. Somehow the
state would need to convince a court that its budget deficits and
public-pension underfunding are so severe that no reasonable
alternatives exist to impairing public pensions.
Of the two proposed solutions for the state pension liabilities,
bonds would face fewer legal challenges than bankruptcy and might
be seen modest but practical. The bonds are a limited federal bailout
where Congress would exempt from tax a state's pension-obligation
bonds in exchange for a state agreeing to specific austerity measures.
Because courts have recognized Congress's broad discretion in its
spending, conditional debt obligations for state pensions would likely
survive a constitutional challenge. These conditions on the pensions
increase the probability of the state paying the pension-bond
obligations and seem reasonably related to the preferential tax
treatment of the bonds funding those pensions.
Bankruptcy for states, the second and more speculative solution,
would face many more legal, practical and political challenges.
Arguably the Bankruptcy Clause of the Constitution is worded
broadly enough to allow voluntary bankruptcy for states, and would
preempt contradictory state law under the Supremacy Clause. Yet,
even if Congress were to establish a new chapter of bankruptcy for
states and the Supreme Court found it constitutional, states may in
the end determine that on a practical level declaring bankruptcy
creates more social, political, and other economic problems than it
solves. At a fundamental economic level, bankruptcy provides debt
relief. The first state to declare bankruptcy, however, might
anticipate a long, hard and expensive legal battle through the federal
court system to establish the constitutionality of bankruptcy for
states. A state's declaration of bankruptcy might result in other
unintended consequences such as increased volatility in financial
markets, damage to the state's credit rating, lack of bondholder trust,
and increased political turmoil. Because of these significant and
potential risks, a state would file bankruptcy only in response to an
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overwhelming liquidity crisis and as a last resort option when every
other option fails.
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